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Abstract
After Lehman’s collapse in 2008, investors ran from risky money market funds. In 27 funds,
outflows overwhelmed cash inflows, thus forcing asset sales. These funds sold their safest
and most liquid holdings. Funds were thus left with riskier and longer maturity assets.
Over the subsequent quarter, however, the hard-hit funds reduced risk more than other
funds. In contrast, money funds hit by idiosyncratic liquidity shocks before Lehman did
not alter portfolio risk. The result suggests that moral hazard concerns with the Treasury
Guarantee of investor claims did not increase risk taking. Funds that benefited most from
the government bailout reduced risk.
I. Introduction
This article studies how money market fund portfolios changed after the run
that followed the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on Sept. 15, 2008. We focus on
how money funds met withdrawal demands through portfolio reallocations in both
the short run and the long run. Funds hardest hit by investor runs reacted initially
by meeting withdrawal demands with cash generated from maturing assets and
by selling off the safest and most liquid holdings. As a result, immediately after
the run ended, hard-hit funds had increased portfolio risk and lengthened asset
maturity relative to other funds. By the end of 2008, however, these hard-hit funds
had reallocated their investments to safer and shorter term investments than what
they had held on the eve of the crisis.
Consistent with other research (McCabe (2010), Kacperczyk and Schnabl
(2013)), we start by showing that fund flows responded rationally to the sharp
change in expectations about the risks of commercial paper investments. Due to its
large exposure to Lehman Brothers’ commercial paper, the Reserve Primary Fund
“broke the buck” on Sept. 16, 2008. This announcement initiated a run across the
money market industry, whereby institutional investors withdrew funds en masse
from risky prime funds (a major holder of commercial paper) and, in aggregate,
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reallocated their investments to safer funds holding mainly U.S. government se-
curities and repurchase agreements (repos). Retail investors also withdrew from
risky funds, but on a somewhat smaller scale than institutional investors. Cross-
sectional regressions suggest that funds most heavily invested in risky assets, such
as commercial paper, faced the largest outflows.
Figure 1 graphs the evolution of total net assets (TNA) in the mutual fund
business over time. The figure separates the data into four groups based on the
fund’s main asset class and investor type: prime-institutional, prime-retail,
government-institutional, and government-retail. First, the figure shows that in-
stitutional investors dominate TNA and aggregate flows in the industry. Second,
the figure shows a dramatic reallocation of total investment from the prime (risky)
to the government (safe) funds. Figure 2 shows the percentage change in TNA
during the days surrounding the Lehman collapse: just before (Sept. 9–12), during
(Sept. 15–19), and after (Sept. 22–23), again separated by clientele and investment
strategy.
We focus on how funds adjusted their positions in response to these large
flows. In general, funds facing liquidity pressure can minimize short-run costs
first by using cash from maturing assets to pay claims, and second by selling their
most liquid (and safe) nonmaturing assets before selling less liquid (and less safe)
assets. Because such a strategy leaves the fund holding riskier and less liquid
assets than before the shock, however, long-run stability could be jeopardized
by continued outflows. Hence, a fund facing outflows that it fears may continue
could instead opt to sell some of its less liquid positions to maintain a liquidity
buffer to insure against continued outflows. We find strong evidence consistent
with the first strategy. This behavior likely reflects, first, the reality that selling
risky holdings such as commercial paper became all but impossible in the days
FIGURE 1
Aggregate TNA by Category (billions of $)
Figure 1 reports the time series of aggregate total net assets (TNA) held by money market mutual funds from Sept. 2005
to the end of 2011 for the four segments of the money market mutual fund industry.
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FIGURE 2
Flow as Percentage of TNA during the Days Surrounding Lehman’s 2008 Bankruptcy
Figure 2 reports the daily percentage change in aggregate TNA during the days just before and just after the Lehman
bankruptcy (Sept. 15, 2008) for the four segments of the money market mutual fund industry.
following the Lehman bankruptcy. Most potential buyers would have been other
prime funds, which themselves faced liquidity pressures. Second, the rapid initia-
tion of government protection provided to investors obviated concerns about long-
run viability for liquidity-stressed funds. The U.S. Treasury provided an ex post,
across-the-board guarantee against breaking the buck for all money market funds
on Sept. 19, 2008 (excluding the Reserve Primary Fund, which had already broken
the buck). As should be clear from Figure 2, this policy action stopped the run
after just 4 days. The Treasury program was available to all money funds for
1 basis point per dollar of net asset value. We find that funds more exposed to
outflows and holding a greater share of high-risk, high-yield assets were more
likely to enter the program.
We then test whether mutual funds made long-run changes to their portfo-
lio allocations after the crisis. We focus on prime funds because these faced the
greatest outflows during the crisis. Prime funds hardest hit by the runs, that is,
those initially holding relatively riskier and longer maturity assets and those fac-
ing the largest cash withdrawals, reduced risk relative to other prime funds by
the end of 2008. These hard-hit funds increased their holding of safe assets and
shortened the weighted-average maturity of their holdings. We find that the move
toward safer assets persisted up to 2 years after the Lehman collapse. We also
compare these long-run changes with similar cases of illiquidity observed before
2008. During the earlier period, illiquidity occurred idiosyncratically rather than
clustering around a systemic event like Lehman’s collapse. Our results suggest
that funds shorten maturity after idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, but they do not
alter their relative weight in risky assets.
Our findings suggest that reasonable concerns about moral hazard effects of
government bailouts on risk-taking incentives may not be justified, at least in this
setting. The Treasury bailout had differential effects across the mutual fund indus-
try, with the greatest benefits accruing to funds that had the most risk precrisis, as
these funds suffered the highest outflows during the crisis. Rather than increase
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risk, as standard moral hazard arguments would predict, we find that these “bailed
out” funds reduced their risk relative to other funds. We also test whether funds
that actually purchased Treasury protection changed their risk profile over the
subsequent months but find little robust evidence that they did. Thus, our results
do not support the idea that the Treasury Guarantee Program, to the extent that it
embedded expectations of future guarantees, led money market fund managers to
increase risk.
Our article contributes to a small literature on the causes and consequences
of the run on the money market industry after Lehman’s failure.1 McCabe (2010)
shows that runs were “rational” in that they were concentrated in high-risk funds,
using reasonable measures of investment risk and the likelihood of sponsor sup-
port. Similarly, Schmidt, Timmermann, and Wermers (2013) find that runs were
more pronounced among institutional investors, with such investors tending to
move their money from a prime (risky) fund to a government (safe) fund, often
within the same family. Most recently, Chernenko and Sunderam (2014) show
that institutional investors again fled risk associated with money funds’ exposure
to European banks during the summer of 2011, when concerns about sovereign
risk peaked.
Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2013) study precrisis risk taking by money funds.
They describe the behavior of the Reserve Primary Fund, which expanded its in-
vestment into high-risk, high-yield assets (e.g., asset-backed commercial paper
(ABCP)) very aggressively during the run-up to Lehman and, as a result, were
able to induce huge investor inflows (due to high yields). They find a similar pat-
tern across other funds that, like the Reserve Primary Fund, were not sponsored by
financial conglomerates. Funds owned by large financial institutions with substan-
tial nonfund business, in contrast, did not plunge into risky investments, suggest-
ing that sponsor “skin in the game,” in the form of reputational capital at risk, can
mitigate risk-taking incentives by money fund managers. Our article complements
Kacperczyk and Schnabl’s (2013) study by documenting that this risk-taking be-
havior seems to have reversed following the Lehman collapse. Risky funds hit
hard by the crisis reallocated their investments away from risk and toward liquid-
ity between the Lehman collapse and the end of 2008, reversing the run-up in risk
behavior before the crisis.
This article is organized as follows: Section II briefly describes the evolution
of the money market fund industry leading up to the 2008 crisis. Section III then
describes our data, methods, and results. Section IV contains a short conclusion.
II. Industry Description
Money market mutual funds originated during the high-interest-rate envi-
ronment of the 1970s. Checkable money market mutual funds such as the Merrill
Lynch Cash Management Account demonstrated to savers that banking by mail
1Qian and Tanyeri (2011) and Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2010) analyze the potential for runs in
equity mutual funds before Lehman. Qian and Tanyeri analyze flows and returns to equity funds under
investigation for market timing and late trading in 2003 and show how fire-sale costs might provide
incentives for early withdrawal. Chen et al. investigate how incentives for early withdrawal might be
amplified in equity funds with illiquid investments.
available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109015000101
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Library, on 02 Feb 2017 at 01:15:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
Strahan and Tanyeri 123
and telephone could provide a convenient alternative to branch-based deposits.
Moreover, in the 1970s commercial banks faced limits on their ability to pay
interest on deposits; such regulations did not constrain money market funds. By
offering stable but liquid claims with limited check-writing features, these ac-
counts provided a close substitute for bank deposits. The competitive advantage
of money market accounts grew dramatically during the latter part of the 1970s
because short-term interest rates soared to nearly 20%. With bank deposit rates
constrained by regulation, funds flowed from banks to money market accounts;
this disintermediation induced banks to support deregulation of restrictions on
interest rates payable on deposits. Thus, from 0 in 1970, money market mutual
funds grew to roughly one-third the size of deposits held at banks by the 1980s
(Kroszner and Strahan (2006)).
In the 1990s and 2000s, money market funds became a major supplier of
savings to support the shadow banking system (Gorton and Metrick (2012),
Gorton, Lewellen, and Metrick (2012), and Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov
(2014)). Money funds became major buyers of ABCP, thereby financing securi-
tized assets that had been held on the balance sheets of traditional banks (Acharya,
Schnabl, and Suarez (2013)). Money market funds also began to supply large-
scale funds to lightly regulated investment banks in the repo market that these
institutions in turn used to finance their holdings of securitized assets. Between
1990 and 2007, for example, assets held by investment banks rose from 5%
to 25% of assets held by commercial banks, and 50% of those assets were fi-
nanced in the repo market using funds held in money market accounts (Gorton
and Metrick (2012)). Thus, much of the asset transformation that occurred on the
balance sheets of heavily regulated commercial banks moved to the less regulated
shadow banking system, with money market funds playing the deposit-taking role
and investment banks and ABCP conduits playing the lending role (by holding se-
curitized assets).2
Despite its rapid expansion and growing importance as a source of savings
to the financial system, the money market business enjoyed a track record of sta-
bility and safety until 2008. Money market funds are regulated by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) under Rule 2a-7, which limits their credit- and
liquidity-risk exposures. Money funds, for example, may not purchase assets with
maturity greater than 13 months, they must not have a weighted-average maturity
greater than 60 days, and they must hold mainly highly rated instruments such
as commercial paper, repos, and U.S. government securities. Moreover, many
money market funds are sponsored by large financial institutions that have, in a
few cases before 2008, stepped in to support their funds rather than allow investors
to experience losses of principal (McCabe (2010)). Brady, Anadu, and Cooper
(2012) systematically study parent-firm noncontractual support (in the form of
a cash contribution or a purchase of fund securities at above-market prices) to
their money market funds from 2007 to 2011. They find more than 100 instances
of such support, although in most cases the infusions of capital are very small
(<0.5% of assets).
2For a policy discussion of shadow banking as regulatory arbitrage, see Kroszner and Strahan
(2011).
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The money market funds aim to maintain a stable net asset value, paying a
periodic return to investors much as banks pay interest to depositors. The industry
is segmented into four groups based on clientele (retail vs. institutional) and port-
folio risk (government funds vs. prime funds). Retail funds serve small investors.
Institutional funds serve corporations, governments, and other large pooled invest-
ment vehicles. Typically, institutional funds require large minimum balances but
come with lower fees than retail funds. Government funds hold mainly U.S. gov-
ernment securities and repos, whereas prime funds hold mainly commercial paper
and unsecured short-term claims issued by financial institutions (mainly banks).
Despite the safety and short maturity of their assets, the market value of claims can
vary; hence, money market funds are required to disclose losses to investors that
exceed 0.5%. Such events, known as breaking the buck, were rare until the 2008
financial crisis. Perception about money fund safety, however, shifted dramati-
cally after the Lehman bankruptcy when the Reserve Primary Fund announced
that it had incurred losses on its large holdings of Lehman-issued commercial
paper. This announcement triggered a run concentrated among prime funds cater-
ing to institutional investors (recall Figure 1). Below we explore cross-sectional
patterns in these outflows.
The reallocation of fund investments out of the prime segment severely con-
strained the functioning of the commercial paper market because these money
market funds had been the most important holder of commercial paper. Concern
about the inability of large issuers to roll over commercial paper as it came due
led the U.S. Treasury to announce the Treasury Guarantee Program for Money
Market Mutual Funds on Friday, Sept. 19, 2008, just 4 days after Lehman declared
bankruptcy.3 This program permitted funds invested up to the 19th to be insured
against breaking the buck by the U.S. government without limit, but required the
individual money market fund itself to voluntarily enter the program for a fee of
1 basis point per dollar insured. The program was not available to any fund that
broke the buck before the close of business on Sept. 19, 2008; therefore, the pro-
gram was not available to the Reserve Primary Fund. On the same day, the Federal
Reserve announced the creation of the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money
Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, which extended nonrecourse loans to U.S.
depository institutions and bank holding companies to finance their purchase of
high-quality, ABCP from money market mutual funds. Two weeks later, the Fed-
eral Reserve created the Commercial Paper Funding Facility to provide additional
support to U.S. issuers of commercial paper.4
Together these government programs halted the run on money market funds
and restored liquidity to the commercial paper market (Duygan-Bump, Parkinson,
Rosengren, Suarez, and Willen (2013)).5 In fact, Figure 1 shows that funds be-
gan flowing from the government sector back into the prime sector shortly after
Treasury’s announcement. Commercial paper outstanding follows a similar pattern
3See http://www.finra.org/investors/protectyourself/investoralerts/mutualfunds/p117136
4See http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cfm?p=timeline#2008-9
5Liquidity was not restored to the interbank funding markets until Oct. 14, 2008, when the nine
largest banks agreed to receive capital injections from the U.S. Treasury under the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP) legislation.
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over time, with a sharp drop in commercial paper issued by financial companies
just after Lehman, and a subsequent gradual recovery over the subsequent months
(Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2010)).
III. Data, Empirical Methods, and Results
A. Data
We compile the sample of taxable money market mutual funds using the
iMoneyNet database. iMoneyNet provides data on share-level and master-level
funds. A master-level fund can have many types of shares with different expense
structures and a common investment portfolio. For example, the same portfolio
may have an institutional share class and a retail share class. Because we are
interested in how fund managers adjust their portfolios in response to a large liq-
uidity shock, we focus on master-level funds rather than share-level funds.6 Funds
at the master level are defined as either retail or institutional in their prospectus,
although some funds offer both share classes. In our sample, most funds defined as
institutional have the vast majority of TNA in the institutional share class category
(with an average of 85%), and for funds defined as retail, the majority of TNA are
in retail share classes (with an average of 99%). Each master-level fund is used
only once in our regressions. We collect data on TNA (reported on a daily basis),
portfolio composition (reported on a weekly basis as of each Tuesday), and fund
characteristics.
Table 1 contains a description of money market portfolios at year end from
2005 to 2010, as well as on Tuesday, Sept. 9, 2008, the last reporting date before
the Lehman collapse. We split the data into four bins based on investor type
(retail vs. institutional) and fund risk (prime funds vs. government funds). On
the eve of Lehman collapse, Sept. 9, 2008, 16% of sample funds were classified
as government-retail, 29% as government-institutional, 25% as prime-retail, and
31% as prime-institutional.
The data show that the government funds invest mainly in safe assets such
as government securities and repos, whereas prime funds invest mainly in riskier
assets, such commercial paper and non-deposit-bank obligations. These portfo-
lio differences are reflected in yields, which are consistently higher in the prime
funds. The yield differentials are greatest between 2007 and 2008, reflecting in-
creased risk premiums during the subprime crisis and the ensuing financial crisis.
We see very little difference in yields between retail and institutional money mar-
ket funds, although in the government sector the institutional funds invest more in
repos, which allows them to operate with lower weighted-average maturities. The
most striking change over time is the decline in risk and shortening of maturity
in the prime segment relative to the government segment at the end of 2008. This
aggregate shift makes sense because these funds were hardest hit by the liquidity
shock following Lehman’s collapse. As we will show, the same patterns emerge
6We also looked at flow data at the share-class level and found similar results to those reported
below.
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TABLE 1
Portfolio Composition of Money Market Mutual Funds
Table 1 reports the mean portfolio composition of four types of money market mutual funds (government-retail, government-
institutional, prime-retail, prime-institutional) at year-end 2005 through 2010, along with the last report before Lehman’s
collapse. GROSS YIELD is the gross (before expenses) weekly dividend payout; RISKY SHARE is the sum of commercial
paper and non-deposit-bank obligations as a percentage of assets; and WAM is the weighted-average maturity.
Year-End Year-EndOn the Eve
of Lehman:
2005 2006 2007 9/9/2008 2008 2009 2010
Panel A. Government-Retail Money Market Mutual Funds
GROSS YIELD (%) 4.1 5.2 4.1 2.2 0.9 0.2 0.2
RISKY SHARE (%) 4.8 3.9 5.6 10.1 7.3 8.9 11.3
WAM (days) 36.6 37.1 40.7 40.4 49.0 45.7 40.5
No. of funds 86 81 75 73 68 63 57
Panel B. Government-Institutional Money Market Mutual Funds
GROSS YIELD (%) 4.2 5.2 4.0 2.1 0.8 0.2 0.2
RISKY SHARE (%) 5.4 5.2 6.1 10.7 8.1 8.1 8.6
WAM (days) 26.3 25.0 29.2 32.0 40.2 42.3 42.9
No. of funds 122 125 128 128 124 115 104
Panel C. Prime-Institutional Money Market Mutual Funds
GROSS YIELD (%) 4.3 5.4 4.9 2.7 1.7 0.3 0.3
RISKY SHARE (%) 77.4 80.7 75.8 75.5 71.0 73.0 66.5
WAM (days) 34.7 41.6 39.0 42.6 38.3 42.8 38.6
No. of funds 131 130 137 137 132 120 111
Panel D. Prime-Retail Money Market Mutual Funds
GROSS YIELD (%) 4.3 5.4 5.0 2.7 1.7 0.4 0.3
RISKY SHARE (%) 83.6 87.3 83.3 81.9 75.6 77.0 68.9
WAM (days) 37.4 42.1 43.1 44.7 41.8 46.8 37.9
No. of funds 123 114 109 111 109 101 93
in the cross section of funds, meaning that funds hardest hit by the post-Lehman
runs reduced risk and shortened maturity the most.
B. Measuring Money Market Liquidity Shocks
We want to estimate how money market funds respond to liquidity shocks,
and contrast their behavior following idiosyncratic shocks (e.g., instances of cash
redemption demands before the Lehman collapse) with their responses to sys-
temic liquidity shocks that occurred in the days after Lehman’s fall. Most out-
flows can be met using cash from maturing assets because money market funds
hold short-term assets with an average dollar-weighted maturity of about 40 days
(recall Table 1). In other words, each week nearly 20% of TNA mature for the typ-
ical fund. Very large outflows, however, may overwhelm a fund’s ability to meet
withdrawal demands with maturing assets, thereby forcing the fund to sell non-
maturing assets. Thus, we are interested in measuring the effects of two variables
related to flow, one simply measuring the fraction of investment lost and the other
measuring the degree to which the fund is forced to sell assets. Hence, we define
OUTFLOW as follows (with fund-level subscripts temporarily suppressed):
OUTFLOWt→t+k = −(TNAt+k − TNAt)/TNAt.
OUTFLOW simply measures a fund’s net loss (gain if negative) of investment
during a k-day interval from t to t + k. (Adjusting for the portfolio return in our
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case has a tiny impact on the flow measure because the typical yield over a 2-week
period is roughly 10 basis points.) We define ILLIQUIDITY as follows:
If TNAt+k − TNAt + ASSETS MATURINGt+k < 0, then
ILLIQUIDITYt→t+k = −(TNAt+k − TNAt
+ ASSETS MATURINGt+k)/TNAt.
Otherwise,
ILLIQUIDITYt→t+k = 0.
ILLIQUIDITY measures the fraction of a fund’s assets that must be sold
to meet redemption demands during the k-day interval. ILLIQUIDITY equals 0
during most intervals because outflows tend to be small relative to asset maturity.
During the days after Lehman’s collapse, however, 27 money market funds could
meet redemptions only by selling assets.
Our data allow us to observe TNA each day, so we can measure precisely
the loss of assets that occurred between the Lehman collapse and the Treasury
Guarantee announcement (Sept. 15–19, 2008). As Figure 2 shows, the outflows
dropped sharply immediately following this announcement. Between Sept. 15 and
19, for example, the prime-institutional fund category in aggregate lost almost
$300 billion; during Sept. 22 and 23, the Monday and Tuesday of the following
week, these outflows dropped to less than $20 billion. Thus, the run effectively
was stanched by the U.S. Treasury’s commitment to backstop all existing invest-
ments. We are able to measure fund portfolio characteristics (e.g., maturing as-
sets) only each Tuesday, however; therefore, we can measure holdings on Tuesday,
Sept. 9 (prerun); Tuesday, Sept. 16 (midrun); and Tuesday, Sept. 23 (postrun).
Because of this data constraint, we are not able to estimate perfectly the outcomes
of interest, namely, portfolio allocation and maturity measures timed to match
the exact days of the post-Lehman run. Instead, we estimate both OUTFLOW
and ILLIQUIDITY over the 2-week interval that overlaps the run, beginning a
few days before its onset (Sept. 9) and ending a few days after its end (Sept. 23,
2008). So, for each fund i, we build the following flow measures:
OUTFLOWi = −(TNA9/23/08,i − TNA9/9/08,i)/TNA9/9/08,i.
To build our variable measuring how much a fund must fire sale its assets
(ILLIQUIDITY), we approximate the amount of funds maturing that would have
been available to meet the run by assuming that each fund’s assets mature evenly
across time. Hence, we build ILLIQUIDITY as follows:
If TNA9/23/08,i − TNA9/9/08,i + ASSETS MATURING9/23/08,i < 0, then
ILLIQUIDITYi = −(TNA9/23/08,i − TNA9/9/08,i
+ ASSETS MATURING9/23/08,i)/TNA9/9/08,i.
Otherwise,
ILLIQUIDITYi = 0.
To construct ASSETS MATURING9/23/08, we assume that assets mature evenly
across time. For example, if a fund has a weighted-average maturity (WAM) of 40
days, we would assume that 1/40 of the portfolio matures each day. Because we
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can measure WAM on Sept. 9, we assume that the fraction 14/WAM9/9/08,i of
the portfolio generates cash that could be paid to investors in fund i on Sept. 23
(thereby obviating the need to sell assets).7 Thus:
ASSETS MATURING9/23/08,i ∼= (14/WAM9/9/08,i)× TNA9/9/08,i.
Table 2 reports summary statistics on biweekly OUTFLOW for the full sam-
ple (2005–2008) and for the single cross section around the Lehman collapse.
Money market fund flows are highly variable over short intervals of time, with a
mean OUTFLOW of −0.7% (i.e., a +0.7% inflow) overall in the full sample and
a standard deviation of almost 9% over 2-week horizons. Outflows over short
TABLE 2
Summary Statistics for Biweekly Gross Outflow and Illiquidity Measures
Table 2 reports summary statistics on OUTFLOW and ILLIQUIDITY, along with other fund characteristics, for the full sample
of nonoverlapping 2-week periods between 2005 and Sept. 23, 2008. OUTFLOW = percentage change in total net assets
(TNA), with a positive value indicating a decline in TNA; ILLIQUIDITY = (the negative of) the change in TNA plus assets
maturing half-way through the 2-week interval as a percentage of TNA; RISKY SHARE is the sum of commercial paper and
non-deposit-bank obligations as a percentage of assets; GROSS YIELD is the annualized gross (before expenses) weekly
dividend payout; WAM is the weighted-average maturity; EXPENSE RATIO is the annual fund operating expense, net of
waivers and reimbursements, shown as a percentage of average TNA; FUND TNA is the TNA of the fund; and FAMILY
TNA is the TNA of the fund family.
No. of Percent
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Positive
1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel A. Jan. 2005–Sept. 2008
OUTFLOW (%) 44,987 −0.66 9.18 −98.88 99.61 46.81%
ILLIQUIDITY (%) 44,987 0.02 0.74 0.00 57.54 0.19%
ILLIQUIDITY, when positive (%) 85 12.08 12.13 0.00 57.54
RISKY SHARE (%) 44,987 46.94 40.87 0.00 100.00
GROSS YIELD (%) 44,943 4.10 1.16 0.33 5.92
WAM (days) 44,919 35.19 15.92 1.00 89.00
EXPENSE RATIO (%) 44,987 0.43 0.26 0.00 1.58
FUND TNA (millions of $) 44,987 4,334 9,745 0.10 128,255
FAMILY TNA (millions of $) 44,987 49,326 60,852 2.50 342,787
Panel B. Week Ending Sept. 23, 2008
OUTFLOW (%) 439 −2.39 24.06 −95.24 90.87 48.06%
ILLIQUIDITY (%) 439 1.00 5.21 0.00 57.54 6.15%
ILLIQUIDITY, when positive (%) 27 16.26 14.10 0.43 57.54
RISKY SHARE (%) 439 47.14 38.67 0.00 100.00
GROSS YIELD (%) 439 2.40 0.64 0.62 4.46
WAM (days) 437 37.77 15.23 1.00 88.00
EXPENSE RATIO (%) 439 0.40 0.25 0.00 1.51
FUND TNA (millions of $) 439 6,458 12,807 1.00 127,892
FAMILY TNA (millions of $) 439 74,638 94,337 10.80 342,787
Panel C. Week Ending Sept. 23, 2008: For Prime Funds
OUTFLOW (%) 247 7.71 16.76 −82.65 80.39 67.61%
ILLIQUIDITY (%) 247 1.27 5.02 0.00 42.55 9.72%
ILLIQUIDITY, when positive (%) 24 13.08 10.42 0.43 42.55
RISKY SHARE (%) 247 75.96 22.10 0.00 100.00
GROSS YIELD (%) 247 2.78 0.35 1.59 4.46
WAM (days) 246 40.63 13.06 1.00 88.00
EXPENSE RATIO (%) 247 0.41 0.25 0.01 1.51
FUND TNA (millions of $) 247 6,898 14,891 1.00 127,892
FAMILY TNA (millions of $) 247 67,066 90,592 44.70 342,787
7Asset maturity is not measured correctly in our data for floating-rate notes. Because a few funds
hold a large fraction of this asset class, we estimated our main models in Tables 4 and 7 without
them and found similar results; we also controlled explicitly in our regressions for the share of assets
held in floating-rate notes and again found similar results, in terms of both magnitudes and statistical
significance.
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intervals are very common, with OUTFLOW positive about 47% of the time
(Panel A). During the post-Lehman days, however, outflows were large enough
to overwhelm many funds’ ability to meet withdrawal demands with maturing
assets. OUTFLOW averages about−2% during the 2 weeks surrounding Lehman
with a standard deviation of 24% (Panel B); for prime funds, outflow averages
more than 7% (Panel C). The high cross-sectional variation in OUTFLOW reflects
the drastic reallocation of investments across fund types, where money flew out of
high-risk prime funds and into low-risk government funds (recall Figure 1). Table 2
also shows that ILLIQUIDITY was much higher during the Lehman weeks than
during the earlier weeks, with a mean of 1%. During these 2 weeks, 27 funds, which
before Lehman controlled 15% of industry assets, had positive ILLIQUIDITY,
meaning that sales of assets were necessary to meet redemptions. For these funds,
the typical fund had to sell more than 16% of its assets to meet redemptions.
As shown in Panel C of Table 2, 24 of the 27 funds with positive ILLI-
QUIDITY were prime funds; thus, we focus our attention below on this segment
of the money fund industry. The Lehman interval is the only 2-week period in our
sample where more than 5 funds experienced outflows large enough to require
asset sales. Hence, we consider the earlier instances of ILLIQUIDITY as being
idiosyncratic rather than systemic.
C. Outflow during the Crisis
McCabe (2010) shows that money market outflows during the days follow-
ing Lehman’s collapse were concentrated among funds holding high-risk assets.
We start by replicating this basic finding by regressing OUTFLOW on fund risk
measures and other characteristics. We test how the fraction of assets invested in
risky assets (RISKY SHARE) and the gross yield affect flows during the criti-
cal days following Lehman’s demise. Because portfolio composition is measured
crudely in our data set, gross yield offers a second strategy to isolate differences
in risk across funds. Thus, we estimate cross-sectional regressions, where fund-
level subscripts are now included with the dependent variable measured from
t (= prerun: Sept. 9, 2008) to t + k (= postrun: Sept. 23, 2008), and the ex-
planatory variables are observed at time t:
OUTFLOWi = α + βF1 RISKY SHAREi + βF2 GROSS YIELDi(1a)
+ Other Fund-Level Controlsi + εi.
In equation (1a), all right-hand-side variables are measured as of t, so they are
predetermined with respect to the dependent variable.
We report equation (1a) overall, and we then split the sample by customer
type (institutional vs. retail) because, as suggested by aggregate flow data, insti-
tutional investors seemed to react more strongly to risk in reallocating funds than
did retail investors. We follow Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2013) by defining risky
assets, the numerator of RISKY SHARE, as commercial paper plus floating-rate
notes plus non-deposit-bank obligations. They show that yields on these asset
categories exceeded those of government securities by 40 to 60 basis points in
2007 and early 2008. Other (nonrisky) asset categories include U.S. Treasuries,
repos, and bank deposits. Yields on repos and bank deposits exceed those on Trea-
suries by only about 15 basis points.
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To establish whether flow behaves differently during the crisis relative to sit-
uations under which a fund may face an idiosyncratic liquidity shock, we also
report panel regression analogs to equation (1a). These models allow us to test
whether coefficients shift significantly during the systemic liquidity events (when
it may be harder to sell assets) relative to other times. The panel models are struc-
tured as follows:
OUTFLOWi,t = αi + γt + βF1 (RISKY SHARE)i,t(1b)
+ βF2 CRISISt × (RISKY SHARE)i,t
+ βF3 (GROSS YIELD)i,t
+ βF4 CRISISt × (GROSS YIELD)i,t
+ Fund-Level Controls and interaction + εi,t.
As in equation (1a), all right-hand-side variables in equation (1b) are measured at
time t, while OUTFLOW is measured from t to t + k.
The panel regressions control for unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity
with fund-level fixed effects (αi) and year-level fixed effects (γt) in addition to
providing convenient coefficients to test whether fund flow differs in response to
risky assets (or yield) during crisis times versus noncrisis other times (βF2 and βF4 ).
The variable CRISIS equals 1 during the weeks of Sept. 9, 2008–Sept. 23, 2008
cross section, and 0 otherwise. We estimate equation (1b) over all nonoverlapping
2-week periods between 2005 and Sept. 23, 2008; hence, the last cross section
in equation (1b) occurs during the crisis weeks. We end the panel then because
the Lehman shock changed the way investors reacted to risk, as well as the way
managers allocated their portfolios (as we show below). Because we include many
biweekly observations during the pre-Lehman weeks, our sample increases from
439 in estimating the cross-sectional regressions (equation (1a)) to almost 45,000
(about 450 funds × about 100 biweekly intervals) in the panel (equation (1b)).
The panel approach compares flow responses to risk in the crisis weeks with those
responses during precrisis weeks.
The control variables in these equations include the weighted average ma-
turity, an indicator for bank-sponsored funds, the log of lagged TNA, total ex-
penses per dollar of average assets, and the log of the lag of the total assets of
the fund family. We also include a government-fund indicator variable, which
in itself absorbs a substantial amount of the variation in RISKY SHARE across
the sample. In the panel regressions, we cluster by fund in building standard
errors to account for an unobserved fund-level heterogeneity that may create cor-
related errors across observations within the same fund and include the CRISIS
indicator.8
Table 3 reports the flow regression estimates. Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the
cross-sectional regressions using just the biweekly period surrounding Lehman’s
collapse. The other columns report the panel regressions.
8We also estimated similar models without the GOVERNMENT FUND INDICATOR and its
interactions with the CRISIS indicator. In these models, RISKY SHARE is much more important
statistically because most of the variation in risky assets comes across investment-style categories
rather than across funds within the same style category.
available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109015000101
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Library, on 02 Feb 2017 at 01:15:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
Strahan and Tanyeri 131
TABLE 3
Regressions of Fund Outflows on Portfolio Risk
Table 3 shows regressions of biweekly OUTFLOW (−(TNAt+k − TNAt) / TNAt) on portfolio risk and other fund characteris-
tics. OUTFLOW is percentage change in TNA, with a positive value indicating a decline in TNA; RISKY SHARE is the sum
of commercial paper and non-deposit-bank obligations as a percentage of assets; GROSS YIELD is the annualized gross
(before expenses) weekly dividend payout; WAM is the weighted-average maturity; GOVERNMENT FUND INDICATOR
takes on the value 1 if the fund is a government fund, and 0 otherwise; INSTITUTIONAL FUND INDICATOR takes on the
value 1 if the fund is an institutional fund, and 0 otherwise; BANK PARENT INDICATOR takes on the value 1 if the fund
parent is a bank, and 0 otherwise; EXPENSE RATIO is the annual fund operating expense, net of waivers and reimburse-
ments, shown as a percentage of average TNA; LEHMAN WEEK INDICATOR takes on the value 1 during the 2 weeks from
Sept. 9, 2008 to Sept. 23, 2008, and 0 otherwise; FUND TNA is the TNA of the fund; and FAMILY TNA is the TNA of the
fund family. Columns 1, 3, and 5 end on Sept. 23, 2008 (the Lehman week). The other columns cover all nonoverlapping
2-week periods from 2005 through Sept. 23, 2008. All independent variables are lagged 2 weeks. All models include an
intercept or ﬁxed effects as noted (coefﬁcients not reported). Standard errors are clustered at the fund level (in panel mod-
els). Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. * and ** indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
NA indicates not applicable.
Full Sample Institutional Funds Retail Funds
Panel Panel
Cross Panel Cross Model, Cross Model,
Section, Model, with Section, with Fund- Section, with Fund-
OUTFLOW Fund- and OUTFLOW and Year- OUTFLOW and Year-
Ending Year-Fixed Ending Fixed Ending Fixed
09/23/08 Effects 09/23/08 Effects 09/23/08 Effects
1 2 3 4 5 6
RISKY SHARE (%) 0.00 −0.02 0.13 −0.03 −0.04 −0.01
(0.04) (2.48)* (0.89) (2.59)* (0.72) (0.53)
GROSS YIELD (%) 24.40 −0.60 18.62 −0.76 24.52 −0.41
(3.35)** (7.92)** (1.36) (6.45)** (3.12)** (5.13)**
WAM (days) −0.19 −0.03 −0.25 −0.04 −0.14 −0.02
(2.38)* (4.97)** (2.15)* (4.07)** (1.47) (2.97)**
GOVERNMENT FUND INDICATOR −12.43 −13.60 −6.31
(2.54)* (1.83) (1.46)
INSTITUTIONAL FUND INDICATOR 3.33
(1.50)
BANK PARENT INDICATOR −2.79 −4.48 0.58
(1.32) (1.35) (0.24)
log(FAMILY TNA) −0.60 −0.11 0.24 −0.19 −1.33 0.10
(1.01) (0.32) (0.25) (0.40) (2.02)* (0.20)
log(FUND TNA) −0.23 2.05 −1.39 2.25 0.48 1.85
(0.25) (4.89)** (0.95) (3.89)** (0.80) (3.80)**
EXPENSE RATIO −14.86 3.37 −27.10 11.91 −7.91 1.88
(2.87)** (2.08)* (2.28)* (1.96) (1.73) (1.28)
RISKY SHARE (%) 0.02 0.16 −0.03
× LEHMAN WEEK INDICATOR (0.23) (1.14) (0.67)
GROSS YIELD (%) 24.17 17.48 24.82
× LEHMAN WEEK INDICATOR (3.36)** (1.30) (3.23)**
WAM (days) −0.18 −0.25 −0.14
× LEHMAN WEEK INDICATOR (2.36)* (2.17)* (1.42)
GOVERNMENT FUND INDICATOR −11.28 −12.25 −6.04
× LEHMAN WEEK INDICATOR (2.44)* (1.75) (1.43)
INSTITUTIONAL FUND INDICATOR 3.26
× LEHMAN WEEK INDICATOR (1.47)
BANK PARENT INDICATOR −2.45 −3.76 0.45
× LEHMAN WEEK INDICATOR (1.18) (1.15) (0.19)
log(FAMILY TNA) −0.61 0.19 −1.28
× LEHMAN WEEK INDICATOR (1.09) (0.21) (1.98)*
log(FUND TNA) −0.15 −1.27 0.44
× LEHMAN WEEK INDICATOR (0.19) (0.99) (0.73)
EXPENSE RATIO −15.00 −26.25 −8.52
× LEHMAN WEEK INDICATOR (3.00)** (2.36)* (1.90)
No. of obs. 439 44,895 257 25,348 182 19,547
Adj. R2 29.40% 3.21% 32.47% 3.56% 25.72% 3.37%
No. of clusters NA 579 NA 330 NA 257
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These flow regressions strongly suggest that during the post-Lehman
days, investors fled risk. This finding is strong for both investor types, although
magnitudes are larger for institutional investors. In the full sample, the RISKY
SHARE coefficient is not significant but both the GOVERNMENT FUND INDI-
CATOR and GROSS YIELD coefficients enter the model significantly, indicating
the high-risk, high-return investments were associated with outflows (column 1 of
Table 3). To understand the magnitude, consider comparing a typical prime fund
(where RISKY SHARE = 80%, GROSS YIELD = 2.7%) with a typical gov-
ernment fund (where RISKY SHARE = 10%, GROSS YIELD = 2.2%). Based
on the coefficients from column 1, the prime find would face outflows of about
25% of TNA relative to the government fund (= 0.00 × (80 − 10) + 24.40 ×
(2.7 − 2.2) + 12.43). This magnitude is very similar to what we observe in the
panel regressions, using the interaction terms (column 2).
When we split the sample based on customer type (columns 3–6 of Table 3),
we find similar effects of GROSS YIELD for both types of investors; for retail
investors, however, GOVERNMENT FUND INDICATOR has a smaller effect
on flow. Combining the effects of the risk variables, the overall effect of risk on
flow is greater for the institutional investor class, although both share classes do
flee risk. Consider again comparing the typical prime fund with the typical gov-
ernment fund. For institutional investors, the cross-sectional model (column 3)
predicts outflow of 32% for prime funds relative to government funds (= 0.13 ×
(80− 10) + 18.62 × (2.7− 2.2) + 13.60); for retail investors, the cross-sectional
model (column 5) predicts a relative outflow of just 16% (= −0.04 × (80− 10) +
24.52× (2.7−2.2) + 6.31). The panel models have similar effects, again based on
the interactive coefficients. The direct effects suggest that during normal market
conditions, gross yield is negatively associated with outflow, reflecting a sensible
flow–performance link.
D. Short-Run Responses: Changes in Portfolio Allocation and the
Treasury Guarantee Program
The flow results establish what earlier researchers have found, namely, that
institutional investors responded very dramatically to the crisis by pulling money
away from high-risk funds and toward low-risk funds. What is less appreciated
but also true: Retail investors responded similarly, albeit less dramatically (with
smaller magnitudes in the cross section).
We focus on how this liquidity shock affected money market fund managers.
How did fund managers respond to the outflows? In this subsection we explore,
first, short-run portfolio changes and, second, the decision of whether to enter
the Treasury Guarantee Program. As noted above, this program insured all fund
investments invested as of Sept. 19, 2008, provided that the fund itself entered the
program for a fee of 1 basis point per dollar of insured. Money market funds had
to decide whether to enter the program by Oct. 8, 2008. (The program could not
be entered by individual investors.)9
9The program was initially in effect for 3 months but was later extended through Sept. 18, 2009.
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To understand how liquidity-stressed funds adjusted their portfolio alloca-
tions, we first estimate cross-sectional models with the following structure:
ΔPORTFOLIOi = α + βPC1 OUTFLOWi + βPC2 ILLIQUIDITYi(2a)
+ Fund-Level Controlsi + εi.
As dependent variables, we consider changes in the share invested in risky
assets (ΔRISKY SHARE) and changes in the weighted-average maturity
(ΔWAM) between Sept. 9, 2008 and Sept. 23, 2008. We define RISKY SHARE
as before: commercial paper plus floating-rate notes plus non-deposit-bank obli-
gations divided by assets. Also as before, we report panel regressions (again, with
a much larger sample size reflecting the many precrisis observations included)
that allow us to test whether illiquidity during the post-Lehman weeks affected
fund management differently than during other earlier idiosyncratic instances of
illiquidity. Thus, we estimate a second set of panel models such as:
ΔPORTFOLIOi,t = αi + γt + βPC1 OUTFLOWi,t + βPC2 ILLIQUIDITYi,t(2b)
+ βPC3 CRISISt × OUTFLOWi,t
+ βPC4 CRISISt × ILLIQUIDITYi,t
+ Fund-Level Controlsi,t + εi,t.
We model short-run portfolio adjustments at a biweekly frequency because the
key event in our data set, the post-Lehman run, straddles 2 weeks, yet we observe
portfolio attributes only at a weekly frequency (Tuesday to Tuesday).
As another dimension of non-portfolio-related adjustments to the liquidity
shock, we estimate a probit model, where the dependent variable equals 1 if a
fund decides to enter the Treasury Guarantee Program, on the same set of ex-
planatory variables. This model allows us to test whether riskier funds and funds
more affected by the liquidity shock were more likely to buy government insur-
ance. In our final set of tests (next subsection), we test for moral hazard effects of
the program by estimating how portfolio weights and investment choices change
over the longer run, conditional on entering the Treasury Guarantee Program.
Tables 4 and 5 report the cross-sectional and panel estimates (equations (2a)
and (2b), respectively), and Table 6 reports the estimates regarding the decision
to enter the Treasury Guarantee Program. Because the prime funds faced the bulk
of the liquidity risk, we estimate these models for prime funds only.
Table 4 shows that money funds hit by large outflows responded by using ma-
turing assets to meet cash demands and, when necessary, by selling their most liq-
uid claims. As a result, the liquidity shock led such funds to be stuck holding high-
risk assets such as commercial paper. In columns 1 and 2, both ILLIQUIDITY
and OUTFLOW are positively related to ΔRISKY SHARE, with OUTFLOW
entering at better than 1% significance. Liquidity pressure (OUTFLOW) led to
short-run declines in repos (a component of the safe category), which also tend to
have the shortest average maturity of money market fund holdings, thus leading
to an increase in weighted-average maturity (columns 3 and 4). The magnitude
suggests that a 1-standard-deviation increase in outflow (σ = 17; recall Table 2)
was associated with an increase in risky assets of 2.4% of TNA (= 0.14 × 17).
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TABLE 4
Regressions of Short-Run Changes in Portfolio Holdings on Illiquidity and Fund
Characteristics (Prime Money Market Funds)
Table 4 reports cross-sectional regressions of changes in portfolio holdings and maturity between Sept. 9, 2008 and
Sept. 23, 2008 on ILLIQUIDITY and OUTFLOW, along with other measures of risk and mutual fund control variables.
ILLIQUIDITY equals the fraction of total net assets (TNA) that a fund must sell to meet redemptions; OUTFLOW equals
the percentage of TNA that ﬂows out of the fund during the 2-week period from Sept. 9, 2008 to Sept. 23, 2008 (see text
for details). RISKY SHARE is the sum of commercial paper and non-deposit-bank obligations as a percentage of assets;
WAM is the weighted-average maturity; GROSS YIELD is the annualized gross (before expenses) weekly dividend payout;
BANK PARENT INDICATOR takes on the value 1 if the fund parent is a bank, and 0 otherwise; INSTITUTIONAL FUND
INDICATOR takes on the value 1 if the fund is an institutional fund, and 0 otherwise; EXPENSE RATIO is the annual fund
operating expense, net of waivers and reimbursements, shown as a percentage of average TNA; FUND TNA is the TNA
of the fund; and FAMILY TNA is the TNA of the fund family. All independent variables are lagged 2 weeks (except for
OUTFLOW and ILLIQUIDITY). Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. * and ** indicate signiﬁcance at the 5%
and 1% levels, respectively.
ΔRISKY SHARE ΔWAM
1 2 3 4
ILLIQUIDITY 0.06 0.03 −0.08 −0.04
(0.43) (0.24) (0.73) (0.37)
OUTFLOW (%) 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.16
(2.95)** (2.88)** (4.89)** (4.40)**
RISKY SHARE (%) 0.10 0.03
(3.55)** (1.50)
WAM (days) −0.02 −0.06
(0.45) (1.67)
GROSS YIELD (%) 5.46 4.18
(1.52) (1.58)
BANK PARENT INDICATOR −2.74 −3.19 −0.38 −0.40
(2.53)* (2.96)** (0.48) (0.50)
log(FAMILY TNA) −0.58 −0.48 −0.03 0.01
(2.05)* (1.65) (0.13) (0.04)
log(FUND TNA) 1.77 1.98 0.40 0.50
(5.06)** (5.65)** (1.50) (1.85)
INSTITUTIONAL FUND INDICATOR −0.76 −1.40 1.64 1.33
(0.55) (1.03) (1.64) (1.33)
EXPENSE RATIO −2.67 −2.16 1.84 1.95
(0.93) (0.75) (0.88) (0.92)
Intercept −8.52 −16.12 −8.35 −15.14
(2.70)** (2.01)* (3.59)** (2.54)*
No. of obs. 247 247 246 246
Adj. R2 22.88% 26.06% 20.21% 21.03%
Mean of dependent variable −2.34 −2.95
Std. dev. of dependent variable 8.98 6.42
Maturity also increases substantially; a 1-standard-deviation increase in outflow
was associated with an increase in maturity of nearly 3 days (= 0.17× 17).
Table 5 offers a broader perspective on the first set of results by allow-
ing us to compare how funds respond to systemic liquidity shocks (after the
fall of Lehman) with idiosyncratic liquidity shocks that had occurred earlier.10
The first set of coefficients reflects the typical response to illiquidity, whereas
the second set of interaction terms reflects the differential effect of illiquidity
10Although we cannot determine why every money market fund faced illiquidity, about one-fourth
of the funds that faced pre-Lehman illiquidity were very small and simply overwhelmed by large out-
flows. In some other cases for large funds, shocks to the sponsor’s reputation seem to have generated
large outflows. For example, a Legg-Mason-owned money market fund experienced a large outflow
when another (equity) fund sponsored by Legg Mason incurred large losses in a single day due to
a large exposure to Google. In another case, a money market fund sponsored by Oppenheimer faced
large outflows when the firm and its chief executive officer (CEO) were named in a suit by the National
Association of Securities Dealers.
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TABLE 5
Panel Regressions of Short-Run Changes in Portfolio Holdings on Illiquidity and Fund
Characteristics (Prime Money Market Funds)
Table 5 reports panel regressions of changes in portfolio holdings and maturity on ILLIQUIDITY and OUTFLOW, along
with other measures of risk and mutual fund control variables. ILLIQUIDITY equals the fraction of total net assets (TNA)
that a fund must sell to meet redemptions; OUTFLOW equals the percentage of TNA that ﬂows out of the fund during the
2-week period (see text for details). RISKY SHARE is the sum of commercial paper and non-deposit-bank obligations as
a percentage of assets; WAM is the weighted-average maturity; GROSS YIELD is the annualized gross (before expenses)
weekly dividend payout; LEHMANWEEK INDICATOR takes on the value 1 during the 2weeks fromSept. 9, 2008 to Sept. 23,
2008, and 0 otherwise; EXPENSE RATIO is the annual fund operating expense, net of waivers and reimbursements, shown
as a percentage of average TNA; BANK PARENT INDICATOR takes on the value 1 if the fund parent is a bank, and 0
otherwise; INSTITUTIONAL FUND INDICATOR takes on the value 1 if the fund is an institutional fund, and 0 otherwise;
FUND TNA is the TNA of the fund; and FAMILY TNA is the TNA of the fund family. All independent variables (except for
OUTFLOW and ILLIQUIDITY) are lagged 2 weeks. All models include intercept and ﬁxed effects as noted (coefﬁcients
not reported). Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. * and **
indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
ΔRISKY SHARE ΔWAM
1 2 3 4
ILLIQUIDITY −0.62 −0.60 −0.03 0.06
(5.33)** (5.34)** (0.15) (0.27)
OUTFLOW 0.19 0.18 0.13 0.12
(10.93)** (11.24)** (13.16)** (13.03)**
RISKY SHARE (%) −0.19 −0.02
(13.28)** (3.26)**
WAM (days) 0.00 −0.19
(0.45) (27.87)**
GROSS YIELD (%) 0.45 0.56
(6.01)** (8.11)**
ILLIQUIDITY 0.67 0.65 −0.08 −0.08
× LEHMAN WEEK INDICATOR (4.34)** (4.08)** (0.31) (0.29)
OUTFLOW −0.04 −0.03 0.04 0.04
× LEHMAN WEEK INDICATOR (0.84) (0.53) (1.10) (0.94)
RISKY SHARE (%) −0.05 −0.03
× LEHMAN WEEK INDICATOR (1.64) (1.77)
WAM (days) −0.03 0.03
× LEHMAN WEEK INDICATOR (0.44) (0.93)
GROSS YIELD (%) 5.57 2.84
× LEHMAN WEEK INDICATOR (1.28) (1.60)
log(FAMILY TNA) −0.06 −0.07 0.17 0.45
(0.35) (0.23) (1.64) (1.65)
log(FUND TNA) 0.16 0.65 0.09 0.43
(1.32) (2.81)** (1.04) (2.12)*
EXPENSE RATIO −0.44 0.28 −0.62 0.07
(0.85) (0.31) (0.58) (0.07)
BANK PARENT INDICATOR −2.73 −3.16 −0.36 −0.49
× LEHMAN WEEK INDICATOR (2.64)** (3.15)** (0.47) (0.63)
INSTITUTIONAL FUND INDICATOR −0.96 −1.51 1.65 1.14
× LEHMAN WEEK INDICATOR (0.76) (1.28) (1.82) (1.28)
log(FAMILY TNA) −0.65 −0.47 −0.06 0.08
× LEHMAN WEEK INDICATOR (2.08)* (1.45) (0.33) (0.40)
log(FUND TNA) 1.79 1.87 0.40 0.31
× LEHMAN WEEK INDICATOR (4.52)** (4.50)** (1.53) (1.15)
Expense ratio −2.38 −2.47 2.15 1.13
× LEHMAN WEEK INDICATOR (1.00) (1.05) (1.17) (0.60)
No. of obs. 24,545 24,493 24,472 24,457
No. of groups 319 319 319 319
Adj. R2 6.53% 15.78% 3.89% 13.38%
Mean of dependent variable −0.019 −0.007
Std. dev. of dependent variable 5.75 5.41
(and other effects) during the post-Lehman panic. We see stark differences for
variation in risky assets (but not for maturity) in the prime fund segment.
Under normal market conditions, funds that face outflows use maturing assets
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for cash; this behavior increases weighted-average maturity. The relative weight
on the other asset classes (i.e., classes with longer maturities) increases, leading to
higher weighted-average maturity. However, under liquidity stress such that our
ILLIQUIDITY variable is nonzero, before Lehman, money market funds would
sell risky assets such as commercial paper to meet demands. These declines in
risky assets (e.g., commercial paper) suggest that before Lehman, such assets
could be sold with little market effect to meet cash demands. In contrast, follow-
ing the Lehman collapse, risky asset classes are difficult to impossible to sell
without facing large losses; hence, the interaction of ILLIQUIDITY with the
CRISIS indicator is positive and significant.
The differential effect of ILLIQUIDITY on investments inΔRISKY SHARE
highlights the truly unique aspects of the post-Lehman run on money market
funds. Our results imply that only funds that faced outflows large enough to
overwhelm incoming cash from maturing assets behaved differently with respect
to withdrawal demands compared to firms under normal conditions: The inter-
action of the Lehman indicator with OUTFLOW is not statistically significant.
The effect of ILLIQUIDITY on ΔRISKY SHARE, however, is statistically and
significantly larger during the crisis. OUTFLOW shows no difference relative to
its effects on risk or maturity following idiosyncratic shocks. This makes sense
because the systemic nature of the crisis made it difficult to sell risky paper, thus
forcing these funds to allow the relative weight of risky assets to increase beyond
what would normally be tolerable. ΔWAM, however, does not respond differen-
tially to either OUTFLOW or ILLIQUIDITY during the crisis, probably because
funds always use incoming cash to meet redemptions, regardless of market cir-
cumstances. What differs in the crisis is that the sale of assets such as commercial
paper becomes nearly impossible.
According to Table 6, mutual funds with greater risk (prime funds) and
higher gross yield were more apt to enter the Treasury Guarantee Program. Table 6
TABLE 6
Probit Model of Mutual Fund Choice to Enter Treasury Guarantee Program
Table 6 reports marginal effects from a probit regression where the dependent variable, INSURANCE, takes the value 1
if a fund decides to opt into the Treasury Guarantee Program, and 0 otherwise. ILLIQUIDITY equals the fraction of total
net assets (TNA) that a fund must sell to meet redemptions; OUTFLOW equals the percentage of TNA that ﬂows out of the
fund during the 2-week period (see text for details). RISKY SHARE is the sum of commercial paper and non-deposit-bank
obligations as a percentage of assets; WAM is the weighted-average maturity; GROSS YIELD is the annualized gross
(before expenses) weekly dividend payout; EXPENSE RATIO is the annual fund operating expense, net of waivers and
reimbursements, shown as a percentage of average TNA; BANK PARENT INDICATOR takes on the value 1 if the fund
parent is a bank, and 0 otherwise; INSTITUTIONAL FUND INDICATOR takes on the value 1 if the fund is an institutional
fund, and 0 otherwise; GOVERNMENT FUND INDICATOR takes on the value 1 if the fund is a government fund, and 0
otherwise; FUND TNA is the TNA of the fund; and FAMILY TNA is the TNA of the fund family. All other independent variables
are as of Sept. 9, 2008. Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. * and ** indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
All Funds Prime Funds
1 2
ILLIQUIDITY −0.02 −0.005
(2.50)* (1.70)
OUTFLOW (%) 0.003 0.000
(2.12)* (0.43)
RISKY SHARE (%) 0.000 0.001
(0.06) (1.45)
GROSS YIELD (%) 0.55 0.06
(4.11)** (1.01)
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 6 (continued)
Probit Model of Mutual Fund Choice to Enter Treasury Guarantee Program
All Funds Prime Funds
1 2
WAM (days) 0.003 0.002
(1.57) (2.43)*
INSTITUTIONAL FUND INDICATOR −0.04 0.00
(0.55) (0.09)
GOVERNMENT FUND INDICATOR −0.24
(2.55)*
BANK PARENT INDICATOR 0.20 0.09
(3.73)** (2.84)**
log(FUND TNA) 0.01 0.00
(0.40) (0.40)
log(FAMILY TNA) −0.01 0.01
(0.39) (1.14)
EXPENSE RATIO −0.03 −0.04
(0.21) (0.83)
No. of obs. 439 247
Pseudo R2 37% 33%
INSURANCE (mean) 69% 91%
reports marginal effects, so the coefficients suggest that a government fund was
24% less likely to enter the program and a 50-basis-point yield differential would
lead to another 22.5% difference. These large magnitudes make sense, as 91%
of the prime funds entered the program, as opposed to 41% for the government
funds. When we split the sample, GROSS YIELD continues to play a significant
role for the government funds (not reported for the government sample). For both
groups, we find that bank ownership is positively associated with entering the
Treasury Guarantee Program.
E. Long-Run Portfolio Adjustments
In the Lehman crisis, severely stressed funds added risk in its immediate af-
termath because market liquidity dried up, forcing these funds to hold assets they
normally would have sold to meet redemptions. Moreover, high-risk funds were
more likely to enter the Treasury Guarantee Program than low-risk funds, and they
benefited most from this program because, in its absence, such funds would have
been forced to close or halt redemptions. These facts raise the following question:
How did such funds respond once market conditions returned to normal? Stan-
dard moral hazard arguments might suggest that funds would add risk to exploit
expectations of continued Treasury support, particularly because high-risk funds
had gained market share in the months leading up to the Lehman collapse. Yet
these funds faced a near-death experience. Managers’ concerns about the long-
run stability of their positions could offset risk-taking concerns associated with
newly embedded bailout expectations.
In our last set of tests, we address these issues by estimating whether the ef-
fects of the Lehman liquidity shock had a permanent effect on portfolio allocation
decisions. We first extend the time for constructing portfolio change variables
to the end of 2008 to create the dependent variable in equation (2a). To do so,
we leave constant the right-hand-side variables, as well as the sample, but we
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change the dependent variable to reflect a 3-month adjustment period for the port-
folio, to the end of the year. Thus, we replace the dependent variable in equation
(2a), which represented 2-week changes beginning Sept. 9, 2008, with changes
in risky assets (and changes in maturity) from Sept. 9, 2008 to the end of 2008
(a 3-month change).11
Some of the explanatory variables in our short-run regressions, namely, the
ex ante levels of RISKY SHARE, WAM, and even GROSS YIELD, capture di-
mensions of fund risk that both contributed to the liquidity shock (recall
Table 3) and go beyond liquidity (e.g., by capturing credit risk). We control
for the beginning-of-period levels of these variables in the short-run analysis
(Tables 4 and 5), but their effects are small and generally not statistically signif-
icant. We continue to include these additional dimensions of risk in the long-run
regressions. By including them, we can test whether fund managers changed their
portfolio decisions in reaction to risk dimensions that go beyond the post-Lehman
liquidity shock but nevertheless could increase the likelihood of future liquidity
risk. More generally, if investors shun risk after Lehman, a “flight to quality”
might lead money market fund managers with high-risk portfolios to move most
aggressively toward safe assets.
Table 7 reports the results, again focusing on the sample of prime funds.12
The timing of all but one of the right-hand-side variables remains the same
as before; that is, these explanatory variables are predetermined as of the time
of the Lehman shock. As an additional explanatory variable, we introduce an
indicator equal to 1 for funds that entered the Treasury Guarantee Program. With
this variable, we can test whether the program distorted risk-taking decisions.
Because the indicator for the Treasury Guarantee Program depends on actions
taken by early Oct. 2008, however, it is not strictly predetermined. We have thus
verified that leaving this variable out of the model has almost no effect on the
other coefficients or their statistical significance.
The results suggest that funds “burned” during the crisis, that is, high-risk
funds and funds with insufficient liquidity to meet withdrawal demands without
selling assets, responded over the longer run by lowering asset risk and shortening
maturity. The increase in portfolio risk for illiquid funds in the immediate after-
math of Lehman is more than fully reversed, such that by the end of the year the
most affected funds had reduced risk relative to those less affected (compared to
their risk levels before the Lehman shock). Our ILLIQUIDITY variable, which
again measures the fraction of assets that had to be sold, is negatively related to
both ΔRISKY SHARE (columns 1–4 of Table 7) and ΔWAM (columns 5–8).
The magnitudes are large and economically significant. For example, the typical
illiquid prime fund had to sell about 13% of its assets to meet withdrawals (recall
Table 2). This degree of illiquidity was associated with a decrease in risky asset of
11Eight prime funds and 12 government funds drop out of the sample by the end of 2008.
12We also tested whether the gross yield declines more for funds that faced large outflows as an
alternative measure of risk taking. These results are consistent with those for the change in risky share
and change in maturity reported in Table 7: Both ILLIQUIDITY and OUTFLOW enter the model with
negative coefficients, with the coefficient of ILLIQUIDITY significant at the 5% level and OUTFLOW
insignificant. When we test the joint significance of the two, the F-statistic equals 4.38, significant at
the 5% level.
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TABLE 7
Regressions of Long-Run Changes in Portfolio Holdings on Illiquidity and Fund
Characteristics (Prime Money Market Funds)
Table 7 reports cross-fund regressions of changes in portfolio holdings and maturity between Sept. 9, 2008 and Dec. 30,
2008 on ILLIQUIDITY and OUTFLOW, along with risk and other mutual fund control variables. ILLIQUIDITY equals the
fraction of total net assets (TNA) that a fund must sell to meet redemptions; OUTFLOW equals the percentage of TNA
that ﬂows out of the fund during the 2-week period (see text for details). RISKY SHARE is the sum of commercial paper
and non-deposit-bank obligations as a percentage of assets; WAM is the weighted-average maturity; GROSS YIELD is the
annualized gross (before expenses) weekly dividend payout; EXPENSE RATIO is the annual fund operating expense, net
of waivers and reimbursements, shown as a percentage of average TNA; BANK PARENT INDICATOR takes on the value 1
if the fund parent is a bank, and 0 otherwise; INSTITUTIONAL FUND INDICATOR takes on the value 1 if the fund is an
institutional fund, and 0 otherwise; TREASURYGUARANTEE takes on the value 1 if the fund entered the Treasury Guarantee
Program, and 0 otherwise; FUND TNA is the TNA of the fund; and FAMILY TNA is the TNA of the fund family. All independent
variables (except for OUTFLOW and ILLIQUIDITY) are lagged 2 weeks. Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses.
* and ** indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
ΔRISKY SHARE ΔWAM
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
ILLIQUIDITY −0.59 −0.45 −0.82 −0.60 −0.62 −0.45 −0.53 −0.21
(2.25)* (1.80) (2.50)* (1.89) (2.97)** (2.27)* (1.99)* (0.83)
OUTFLOW (%) 0.12 0.08 −0.05 −0.12
(1.18) (0.78) (0.58) (1.50)
RISKY SHARE (%) −0.29 −0.29 −0.12 −0.11
(4.81)** (4.83)** (2.40)* (2.36)*
WAM (days) −0.32 −0.30 −0.36 −0.39
(3.13)** (2.90)** (4.36)** (4.59)**
GROSS YIELD (%) 15.60 15.22 −0.33 0.34
(2.14)* (2.08)* (0.06) (0.06)
BANK PARENT 0.66 −0.95 0.69 −0.96 −0.54 −1.62 −0.57 −1.63
INDICATOR (0.28) (0.42) (0.30) (0.42) (0.29) (0.90) (0.30) (0.90)
log(FAMILY TNA) 0.90 1.34 0.84 1.30 −0.95 −0.39 −0.93 −0.33
(1.45) (2.24)* (1.36) (2.17)* (1.91) (0.81) (1.86) (0.69)
log(FUND TNA) −0.04 0.42 −0.26 0.27 0.94 1.23 1.03 1.46
(0.05) (0.59) (0.33) (0.37) (1.55) (2.15)* (1.64) (2.48)*
INSTITUTIONAL 0.24 −1.62 −0.08 −1.82 −0.53 −1.50 −0.37 −1.15
FUND INDICATOR (0.08) (0.59) (0.03) (0.65) (0.22) (0.67) (0.16) (0.51)
EXPENSE RATIO −2.64 1.16 −1.43 1.84 3.02 7.16 2.58 6.17
(0.42) (0.19) (0.22) (0.30) (0.59) (1.48) (0.50) (1.27)
TREASURY −2.08 2.36 −2.00 2.35 2.07 6.81 2.03 6.80
GUARANTEE (0.48) (0.56) (0.46) (0.56) (0.60) (2.02)* (0.59) (2.02)*
Intercept −10.88 −27.47 −9.69 −26.15 −4.32 8.67 −4.83 6.39
(1.48) (1.68) (1.30) (1.58) (0.73) (0.66) (0.81) (0.48)
No. of obs. 237 237 237 237 235 235 235 235
Adj. R2 0.33% 12.53% 0.50% 12.38% 4.17% 15.93% 3.89% 16.40%
Mean of dependent variable −5.78 −4.44
Std. dev. of dependent variable 16.42 13.36
8% (= −0.59 × 13, from column 1) of assets by the end of 2008. These funds
shortened average maturity by 8 days (= −0.62 × 13, from column 5), relative
to the average of around 40 days. These effects are smaller when we control for
RISKY SHARE, WAM, and GROSS YIELD, which makes sense because the
high-risk funds were more likely to face large outflows (so adding these absorbs
some of the liquidity effects).
Figure 3 illustrates perhaps the simplest way to digest the combined results
of our short- and long-run analyses. Among the prime funds not hit hard by out-
flows (those with ILLIQUIDITY = 0), risky assets fell by 3.2% on average dur-
ing the run (from Sept. 9 to Sept. 23) and fell an additional 2.7% of net assets by
the end of the year. In contrast, among prime funds hit hard by outflows (those
with ILLIQUIDITY> 0), risky assets rose by 6.0% during the run (because they
were forced to sell nonmaturing, safe assets), but then fell by 14.5% of assets
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FIGURE 3
Change in RISKY SHARE
Figure 3 reports the mean percentage-point change in RISKY SHARE during the 2 weeks surrounding the Lehman
bankruptcy (dark-colored bars) and from Sept. 23, 2008 to the end of the year (light-colored bars). The bars on the left
represent funds not forced to sell assets during the run; the bars on the right represent funds hit with outﬂows large enough
to force them to sell assets.
by year-end, leading to a net drop in risk of 8.5% (= 6.0% − 14.5%) relative to
their position on the eve of the run. Comparing changes from the end of the run
to the end of the year is striking: Illiquid funds cut risk by 14.5%, relative to just
2.7% for liquid funds.
Table 7 also suggests that high-risk funds in general moved toward safer
and shorter maturity investments by the end of 2008. Both RISKY SHARE and
WAM enter the ΔRISKY SHARE and ΔWAM regressions with negative and
statistically significant coefficients (columns 2, 4, 6, and 8). The effects are large
economically. For example, increasing the prerun level of RISKY SHARE by 1
standard deviation would lead to a decline in risky assets of 7% of assets (=−0.29
× 22) by the end of the 2008; similarly, a fund with 1 standard deviation above
average WAM would reduce risk assets by 4% of assets (= −0.32 × 13) more
than average by year-end 2008. We do find, oddly, that GROSS YIELD enters
the regression for ΔRISKY SHARE with a positive effect, but this result is not
robust to dropping the other risk dimensions, nor does gross yield affect ΔWAM
(columns 5–8).
Table 7 offers little evidence that the Treasury Guarantee Program affected
fund asset allocation decisions or incentived risk taking, as moral hazard argu-
ments would predict. The indicator never enters the ΔRISKY ASSETS regres-
sion with a statistically significant coefficient (and its sign flips depending on the
model). In the ΔWAM model, the indicator has a positive effect in two of the
four specifications. Together with the fact that the funds that benefited most from
the government bailout, funds facing the largest outflows, reduced risk over the
subsequent 3 months, this evidence provides little support for the idea that the
Treasury Guarantee Program encouraged excessive risk taking by money market
fund managers.
Table 8 extends the time for portfolio adjustment from the 3-month hori-
zon to 1-year and to 2-year horizons. As in Table 7, we leave the explanatory
variables at their pre-Lehman levels and alter only the time window to build the
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TABLE 8
Regressions of Long-Run Changes in Portfolio Holdings on Illiquidity and Fund
Characteristics (Prime Money Market Funds)
Table 8 reports cross-fund regressions of changes in portfolio holdings and maturity for prime funds between Sept. 9,
2008 and Sept. 22, 2009 (columns 1–4) and between Sept. 9, 2008 and Sept. 21, 2010 (columns 5–8) on ILLIQUIDITY,
along with risk and other mutual fund control variables. ILLIQUIDITY equals the fraction of total net assets (TNA) that
a fund must sell to meet redemptions; OUTFLOW equals the percentage of TNA that ﬂows out of the fund during the
2-week period (see text for details); RISKY SHARE is the sum of commercial paper and non-deposit-bank obligations as
a percentage of assets; WAM is the weighted-average maturity; GROSS YIELD is the annualized gross (before expenses)
weekly dividend payout; EXPENSE RATIO is the annual fund operating expense, net of waivers and reimbursements,
shown as a percentage of average TNA; BANK PARENT INDICATOR takes on the value 1 if the fund parent is a bank, and
0 otherwise; INSTITUTIONAL FUND INDICATOR takes on the value 1 if the fund is an institutional fund, and 0 otherwise;
TREASURY GUARANTEE takes on the value 1 if the fund entered the Treasury Guarantee Program, and 0 otherwise;
FUND TNA is the TNA of the fund; and FAMILY TNA is the TNA of the fund family. All independent variables (except for
ILLIQUIDITY) are lagged 2 weeks. Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. * and ** indicate signiﬁcance at the
5% and 1% levels, respectively.
1-Year Change 2-Year Change
ΔRISKY SHARE ΔWAM ΔRISKY SHARE ΔWAM
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
ILLIQUIDITY −0.23 −0.06 −0.61 −0.36 −0.49 −0.28 −0.60 −0.29
(0.81) (0.21) (2.71)** (1.72) (1.43) (0.95) (2.95)** (1.69)
RISKY SHARE (%) −0.30 −0.07 −0.55 −0.01
(5.03)** (1.57) (6.70)** (0.12)
WAM (days) −0.18 −0.43 −0.03 −0.57
(1.58) (4.77)** (0.25) (7.25)**
GROSS YIELD (%) −7.42 −8.71 −4.94 −10.25
(0.98) (1.46) (0.51) (1.80)
BANK PARENT −1.57 −5.11 −4.00 −5.87 −0.49 −5.39 −1.14 −2.90
INDICATOR (0.63) (2.17)* (2.04)* (3.16)** (0.16) (1.96) (0.61) (1.78)
log(FAMILY TNA) −0.06 0.92 −0.99 −0.17 −0.69 0.31 0.27 1.23
(0.08) (1.48) (1.90) (0.35) (0.83) (0.41) (0.54) (2.80)**
log(FUND TNA) 0.29 0.57 0.73 0.89 0.97 1.09 0.08 0.11
(0.35) (0.75) (1.11) (1.48) (0.92) (1.22) (0.13) (0.21)
INSTITUTIONAL FUND 3.79 1.91 −3.01 −3.85 6.84 3.12 3.29 2.16
INDICATOR (1.18) (0.65) (1.20) (1.66) (1.65) (0.87) (1.32) (1.02)
EXPENSE RATIO 5.03 9.61 −7.48 −2.53 12.79 17.75 −4.94 −0.08
(0.73) (1.52) (1.38) (0.50) (1.39) (2.26)* (0.90) (0.02)
TREASURY −0.84 7.61 6.63 14.02 0.71 11.12 −3.96 3.74
GUARANTEE (0.19) (1.74) (1.87) (4.06)** (0.12) (2.12)* (1.15) (1.21)
Intercept −10.51 22.52 7.88 39.36 −19.91 20.52 −3.94 31.92
(1.35) (1.31) (1.29) (2.90)** (1.96) (1.00) (0.65) (2.65)**
No. of obs. 214 214 214 214 191 191 190 190
Adj. R2 −2.14 15.58 7.47 22.75 −0.51 27.78 4.63 32.75
Mean of dependent variable −6.47 2.79 −10.27 −5.72
Std. dev. of dependent variable 16.32 13.48 19.59 11.95
dependent variables,ΔRISKY SHARE and ΔWAM. The results suggest that the
portfolio changes that occurred during the first 3 months after the crisis persist.
ILLIQUIDITY, RISKY SHARE, and WAM all continue to enter the regressions
with negative coefficients. The coefficients are less statistically significant gener-
ally, which is not surprising given the long time lag, although the effect of RISKY
SHARE (again, measured before the Lehman crash) on ΔRISKY SHARE in-
creases in both magnitude and statistical significance when we extend the horizon
to 2 years. This increased magnitude may reflect tougher SEC regulations for
money market fund investments that were implemented in the summer of 2010.13
13The sample also falls as we lengthen the time horizon because some funds drop out of the data
set. For the short-run regressions in Table 4, we have 247 prime funds; of these, 237 survive to the end
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In our final test, we compare how funds affected by systemic liquidity shocks
(i.e., the 27 funds forced to sell assets after Lehman) adjust their portfolios
relative to funds hit by similar-sized but idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, using a
nonparametric empirical matched-sample comparison.14 We first identify a sam-
ple of funds hit by idiosyncratic liquidity shocks using funds that experienced
a positive value for ILLIQUIDITY at some point before 2008. There are 42 such
cases, 40 of which survive in our data set for the subsequent 3 months.15 We then
stratify these data into 20 ILLIQUIDITY bins, based on the distribution of ILLI-
QUIDITY for the 27 post-Lehman cases of illiquidity. For each of these 27 funds
(the treatment group), we find if possible a same-class mutual fund in the same
or closest ILLIQUIDITY bin with the closest TNA (the control group). Based on
this matching procedure, the average illiquid fund in the treatment group had to
sell 16% of its portfolio, and its TNA before Lehman’s collapse was $16 billion.
The average ILLIQUIDITY in the control sample was 14% of the portfolio, but
average TNA before the liquidity shock was $2 billion. Hence, we are not able to
match perfectly based on size.
Table 9 compares average 3-month changes in risky asset holdings and
changes in weighted-average maturity for the treatment group with two control
groups: all funds that faced illiquidity events (i.e., had positive values for
ILLIQUIDITY) before 2008 (n = 40) and the matched sample described above
TABLE 9
Change in Portfolio Holdings and Maturity in the Long Run for Illiquid Funds
(Prime Money Market Funds)
Table 9 compares the 3-month change in RISKY SHARE and WAM from the Lehman collapse to the end of the year for
funds hit by outﬂows large enough to force asset sales (the treatment group) with changes observed at similarly illiquid
funds before 2008 (the control group). There were initially 27 funds in the treatment group but only 23 are observed at the
end of 2008. The ﬁrst control group contains all cases in which a money fund experienced an outﬂow large enough to force
a sale of assets before 2008 that survived the subsequent 3 months; the second control group ﬁlters the ﬁrst one to match
the magnitude of the illiquidity event in the treatment group (see text for a full explanation). RISKY SHARE is the sum of
commercial paper and non-deposit-bank obligations as a percentage of assets; WAM is the weighted-average maturity;
and TNA is total net assets.
Treatment First Second Difference-in-
Group Control Group Control Group Means Tests
Illiquid
Illiquid Funds, before
Funds Illiquid 2008,
during the Funds, Matched on
Lehman before TNA and t-Test: t-Test:
Run N 2008 N Illiquidity N (1)= (2) (1) = (3)
1 2 3
ΔRISKY SHARE −8.57 23 4.78 40 4.26 23 2.62 1.98
ΔWAM −13.09 23 −10.50 40 −7.22 23 0.54 1.08
of 2008, 214 to the third quarter of 2009, and 191 to the third quarter of 2010. That said, survivorship
is not strongly correlated with the liquidity shock. For example, about 6.2% of the total sample faced
positive illiquidity during the Lehman collapse; by the end of 2010, the share of surviving funds that
faced positive illiquidity was 5.7% of the total sample.
14Regressions would be awkward to design consistently because the pre-Lehman liquidity events
are short-lived and spread out sporadically over time.
15Table 2 reports 85 funds having faced illiquidity events: 42 occurred before 2008, 16 during the
first 8 months of 2008 (before Lehman), and 27 during the 2 weeks after Lehman’s bankruptcy.
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(n = 23).16 We find, consistent with the regressions in Table 7, that firms hit by
illiquidity after Lehman both reduced their risky asset portfolio weight (by 8.6%
of TNA on average) and shortened asset maturity (by 13 days). For both sets of
control firms, however, we find an increase rather than a decrease in risky asset
holding, with a statistically significant difference between the mean change in
the two samples. In contrast, we find no difference in maturity adjustments. All
of the funds seem to react to liquidity shocks, either systemic (post-Lehman) or
idiosyncratic (pre-Lehman) by shortening maturity.
F. Why Did Money Market Funds Reduce Risk?
We have found that money market mutual fund managers responded to the
post-Lehman run by moving toward safer investments. In aggregate, prime insti-
tutional money market funds cut their RISKY SHARE from 76% to 67% from the
eve of Lehman’s collapse to the end of 2010; prime retail funds cut back risk even
more, from 82% to 69% (Table 1). The cross-sectional regression shows that these
changes were greatest among ex ante riskier funds and among funds hit hardest
by outflows. Some of the changes likely occurred in response to tighter SEC reg-
ulations finalized in the middle of 2010 that required money market funds to hold
more liquid and higher credit-quality assets. But many of the adjustments, in both
our aggregate and our cross-sectional analyses, occurred within 3 months of the
Lehman bankruptcy, well before SEC regulations came into effect. This behav-
ior reversed the risk taking that occurred during the run-up to the crash. It may
reflect investor preferences (flight to quality) or managerial preferences (career
concerns) for safety, or some combination of the two. For example, managers of
high-risk funds faced a near-death experience in late Sept. 2008 and watched as
the oldest and one of the largest funds collapsed (the Reserve Primary Fund). The
Treasury Guarantee Program itself was designed to prevent an extension of the
safety net beyond pre-existing money market accounts (new investments were not
covered) so money fund managers may also have been catering to new investors’
desire for high-liquidity, low-risk investments.
IV. Conclusion
We study how money market mutual funds weathered systemic runs that
occurred after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the fall of 2008. In the imme-
diate aftermath, funds facing outflows large enough to overwhelm cash resources
available from maturing assets resorted to selling their most liquid holdings. As a
result, these funds found themselves holding higher risk and longer maturity as-
sets than desired. Over the subsequent quarters, the funds hit hardest responded by
reducing risk relative to their initial holdings before the crisis. Once burned, twice
shy. The result suggests that moral hazard concerns associated with the Treasury
Guarantee of money market investor claims did not lead to increased risk taking.
Rather than increase risk, funds that benefited most from the government bailout
reduced risk relative to other funds.
16Four funds in the treatment group drop out of the sample by Dec. 2008, so we have 23 observa-
tions in both treatment and control groups in the matched-sample approach.
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